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The way to gain a good reputation is to endeavor to be what you 
desire to appear. 
   Socrates1 
 
I don’t give a damn ‘bout my bad reputation. 
 
   Joan Jett2 
INTRODUCTION 
As we write this review, the United States is gripped by one 
of the most contentious and outlandish presidential elections in 
recent memory.3 Justice Antonin Scalia, one of the most conserva-
tive justices in the history of the modern Supreme Court, died in 
 
 † Charles B. Cox III and Lucy D. Cox Family Chair in Law and Liberty and Professor 
of Political Science, Vanderbilt University. 
 †† Professor of Law, Duke University School of Law. The authors thank the twenty-
one judges in the Duke Judicial Studies LLM program (2016–17), Tom Ginsburg, and Jack 
Knight for comments. Susanna Rychlak provided excellent research assistance. 
 1 Edward Parsons Day, Day’s Collacon: An Encyclopædia of Prose Quotations 789 (In-
ternational Printing and Publication Office 1884) (attributing this quotation to Socrates). 
Professors Nuno Garoupa and Tom Ginsburg begin their book with two quotes which pre-
view their thinking about reputation: Benjamin Franklin’s line that “[i]t takes many good 
deeds to build a good reputation, and only one bad one to lose it,” and Michael Iapoce’s less 
well-known observation that “[r]eputation is character minus what you’ve been caught 
doing” (p vii). Hopefully our quotes offer a similar insight to our modest project here. 
 2 Joan Jett, Bad Reputation (Boardwalk Records 1981), lyrics available at 
http://perma.cc/L22C-B6PU. 
 3 See Patrick Healy and Maggie Haberman, Donald Trump and Hillary Clinton Win 
Easily in New York Primary (NY Times, Apr 19, 2016), online at http://www 
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the midst of this political whirlwind,4 and the nomination process 
for his successor has been sucked into the vortex. President 
Barack Obama expressed frustration with Senate Republicans, 
who hold a majority and have promised not to allow a vote, hold 
hearings, or even meet the candidate: “At that point, the judiciary 
becomes a pure extension of politics. And that damages people’s 
faith in the judiciary.”5 By implication, the public’s view of courts 
matters. 
Law professors Nuno Garoupa and Tom Ginsburg have pub-
lished an ambitious book that seeks to account for the great div-
ersity of judicial systems based, in part, on the public’s opinion of 
courts. The structural features of courts, such as whether the 
judges are permitted to (and do) publish dissents, Garoupa and 
Ginsburg explain, can have a significant impact on the public’s 
opinion of courts. Drawing on their own prodigious writings, the 
authors propose a reputation theory “to explain how judges re-
spond to the incentives provided by different audiences and how 
legal systems design their judicial institutions to calibrate the lo-
cally appropriate balance between audiences” (p 7).6 Judges care 
about their reputations. And reputation serves as both cause and 
effect of the design of courts. 
Judicial reputation in Garoupa and Ginsburg’s book operates 
on many levels. A judge has a reputation, but so too does a court 
 
.nytimes.com/2016/04/20/us/politics/new-york-primary.html (visited May 6, 2016) (Perma 
archive unavailable). 
 4 See Wilson Andrews, Jeremy Bowers, and K.K. Rebecca Lai, How Scalia Com-
pared with Other Justices (NY Times, Feb 14, 2016), online at http://www.nytimes.com/ 
interactive/2016/02/14/us/supreme-court-justice-ideology-scalia.html (visited Apr 29, 
2016) (Perma archive unavailable) (showing, based on work by Professors Lee Epstein, 
Andrew D. Martin, and Kevin Quinn, that Scalia was the second most conservative justice 
during nearly all of his tenure and holds roughly the same spot—second or third—among 
all justices who have served since 1937). 
 5 Transcript and Video: President Obama’s Interview with NPR’s Nina Totenberg 
(NPR, Mar 18, 2016), online at http://www.npr.org/2016/03/18/470869897/transcript-and 
-video-president-obamas-interview-with-nprs-nina-totenberg (visited Apr 29, 2016) 
(Perma archive unavailable). 
 6 Prior scholars have also emphasized the importance of understanding judicial be-
havior as a function of the different audiences judges are seeking to speak to, albeit not in 
the context of a reputational theory drawn as sharply as that of Garoupa and Ginsburg. 
See generally, for example, Lawrence Baum, Judges and Their Audiences: A Perspective 
on Judicial Behavior (Princeton 2006) (arguing that judicial behavior can be examined by 
exploring judicial relationships with various audiences, including fellow judges and the 
general public, but also including the social groups with which judges identify); Thomas 
J. Miceli and Metin M. Coşgel, Reputation and Judicial Decision-Making, 23 J Econ Behav 
& Org 31 (1994) (offering a model of judicial decisionmaking that includes a judge’s repu-
tation as a factor). 
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(p 19). Reputation in their theory captures not only the public’s 
view of the judiciary (as a single court or as separate judges), but 
also judges’ opinions of each other (p 23). Finally, reputation has 
a coherent meaning that transcends state boundaries and cul-
tures and operates across time.7 Judicial reputation is challenging 
to define and even more difficult to measure. But this is the task 
that the authors set for themselves. 
We begin this Review by offering a description of the book. A 
responsible book reviewer should, at a minimum, give the reader 
a good feel for the authors’ project. Part I is not a substitute for 
reading this fine book, but hopefully will facilitate a deeper read-
ing of the book. We then move in Part II to our evaluation. We 
find much to like in this book. But we also have questions about 
the ability of the theory to hang together in a unified manner and 
to do the work assigned to it. Part III considers what motivates 
judges. Part IV suggests an alternative account. 
I.  THE CORE CLAIM 
Professors Garoupa and Ginsburg begin their book with an 
unusually valuable introduction to the substantive chapters 
which follow. The introduction is framed by two (in)famous exam-
ples of judicial action: one that strengthened a court’s reputation 
and one that damaged a court’s reputation. The book opens with 
Chief Justice John Roberts’s 2012 Obamacare decision (pp 1–2). 
Roberts not only joined the five-justice majority that upheld the 
constitutionality of the Affordable Care Act (Obamacare), but also 
authored the Supreme Court’s opinion.8 Roberts’s policy prefer-
ence, by any conventional measure, should have been to overturn 
Obamacare (p 1). Thus, he must have chosen to vote against his 
preferred outcome in the immediate case in order to achieve other 
goals. Roberts’s actions appear to have strengthened the view of 
the Court as independent and of himself as a statesman chief in 
the model of Chief Justice John Marshall.9 
 
 7 Finding coherent meaning in any comparative scholarship poses many problems, 
including very basic ones: What is a “court” and who is a “judge” for purposes of drawing 
comparisons? 
 8 See generally National Federation of Independent Business v Sebelius, 132 S Ct 
2566 (2012). 
 9 See Adam Liptak, John Roberts Criticized Supreme Court Confirmation Process, be-
fore There Was a Vacancy (NY Times, Mar 21, 2016), online at http://www 
.nytimes.com/2016/03/22/us/politics/john-roberts-criticized-supreme-court-confirmation 
-process-before-there-was-a-vacancy.html (visited Apr 29, 2016) (Perma archive unavailable) 
(quoting Professor Akhil Amar’s assertion that by standing against the Senate’s opposition 
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Garoupa and Ginsburg draw a sharp and deliberate contrast 
with the sensational Italian murder trial of American exchange 
student Amanda Knox for the killing of her roommate (p 5). The 
Italian judiciary drew unwanted negative attention with its in-
consistent rulings involving multiple courts, multiple trials, mul-
tiple findings of guilt, and ultimately a declaration of Knox’s in-
nocence by the country’s highest court (p 5). The fallout from this 
incident and Italy’s woeful position on a World Bank ranking and 
other rankings of judicial quality (it fares worse than Haiti on at 
least one measure) has included calls for serious reforms to the 
Italian judicial system.10 Writing elsewhere, the authors warn that 
“[a] judiciary with a poor reputation . . . will find itself starved of 
both resources and respect” (p 15). The authors demonstrate that, 
even in two different countries, two dramatically different kinds 
of cases, and two starkly different court structures, judicial repu-
tation matters. But how does it matter? 
The authors argue that reputation is the joist in the con-
struction of any judicial system and continues to play that cen-
tral supporting role as courts operate and evolve (pp 7, 59–65, 
188). A reputation-centered theory, therefore, can explain the 
range of court structures seen throughout the United States and 
the world (pp 28–44). Moreover, court structure itself influences 
how courts are perceived (pp 9–10). The result is a feedback loop 
between the judicial system and the internal and external percep-
tion of the system. In order to further this argument, the authors 
propose a reputation theory of courts and then seek to empirically 
test that theory (p 13). 
A. Theoretical Development 
To build their theory, Garoupa and Ginsburg look to two well-
established theories of political behavior generally and judicial be-
havior specifically: a political economy account and an institutional 
 
to considering a nominee, Roberts would have a “John Marshall moment,” his “third extraor-
dinary moment of . . . showing that he is no partisan,” his first two moments being his votes 
to uphold Obamacare against two separate challenges). 
 10 See, for example, Italy’s Judicial System: Justice Denied? (The Economist, July 
19, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/SCN2-8K2K (reporting on European Central Bank 
President Mario Draghi’s call for reforms to the Italian civil justice system); Gianluca 
Esposito, Sergi Lanau, and Sebastiaan Pompe, Judicial System Reform in Italy—a Key 
to Growth *11–14 (IMF Working Paper No 14/32, Feb 2014), archived at 
http://perma.cc/7SJX-ZBT5 (proposing various reforms to accelerate the pace of cases in 
the Italian judicial system). 
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account. The first substantive chapter—“A Theory of Judicial Rep-
utation and Audiences”—explicitly lays out these theoretical foun-
dations (pp 14–49). The later chapters do not consistently refer 
back to this theoretical framework. But if reputation theory is in-
deed a theory (rather than a description), then the role of these two 
grand theories is important to understand. 
The political economy story begins with the familiar rational 
actor. Judges are rational actors who make decisions that they 
believe will maximize the probability of the attainment of their 
ends (pp 22–23). Their goals include developing their reputations, 
because reputation has an ultimate as well as an instrumental (or 
intermediate) value. That is, judges, like other people, desire that 
(certain) audiences view them favorably. All else constant, judges 
will make a decision that improves their reputation over one that 
worsens their reputation. Judges also understand that being held 
in high esteem can help them attain other ends that they want 
(pp 4–5). Thus, a good reputation is instrumentally valuable. The 
idea of a judge as a rational maximizer is familiar to students of 
judicial behavior.11 
Garoupa and Ginsburg seek to stake out an original theory 
by exploiting the principal-agent model in political economics 
(pp 59–65).12 This model has been used regularly to evaluate the 
structure of courts and the work of judges.13 But Garoupa and 
Ginsburg recast the principal-agent framework by treating repu-
tation as the critical “interaction of an agent and audiences” (or 
principals) (p 6). To understand how this works, we review the 
basic principal-agent model as applied to courts (pp 59–60). The 
public wants disputes resolved and law made and/or interpreted. 
To get those tasks accomplished, the public creates courts and as-
signs to those courts the responsibility to do this work. But, like 
any principal who delegates responsibility to an agent, the public 
worries that judges will act in their own interest, rather than in 
the public’s interest. The public, however, has limited capacity to 
 
 11 See, for example, Lee Epstein, William M. Landes, and Richard A. Posner, The 
Behavior of Federal Judges: A Theoretical and Empirical Study of Rational Choice 29 
(Harvard 2013) (describing the economic theory of judges as rational actors and explaining 
how the authors’ work expands on this approach). 
 12 For an explanation of the role of the principal-agent model in the theory of political 
actors and institutions, see Gary J. Miller, The Impact of Economics on Contemporary Po-
litical Science, 35 J Econ Lit 1173, 1189–93 (1997); Terry M. Moe, The New Economics of 
Organization, 28 Am J Polit Sci 739, 756–58, 765–72 (1984). 
 13 For an early example, see generally Donald R. Songer, Jeffrey A. Segal, and 
Charles M. Cameron, The Hierarchy of Justice: Testing a Principal-Agent Model of Sup-
reme Court–Circuit Court Interactions, 38 Am J Polit Sci 673 (1994). 
11 GULATI&GEORGE_BKR_IC (MLM) (DO NOT DELETE) 9/20/2016 2:26 PM 
1688  The University of Chicago Law Review [83:1683 
   
directly monitor courts to ensure that judges behave properly 
(p 15). Moreover, the public does not want (in an ex ante sense) 
judges to be doing exactly what the public wants (in an ex post 
sense), because a crucial element of good judicial behavior tends 
to be judicial independence from public preferences. The design 
problem, therefore, is that the system has to be set up so that 
judges have incentives to behave in the manner that the public 
wants, without the public being able to evaluate the decisions of 
the judges, and without rewarding judges based on whether the 
public likes the outcomes in those decisions or not (pp 60–61). The 
solution judicial system designers have hit upon, Garoupa and 
Ginsburg explain, is to create judicial accountability via what one 
might call low-powered evaluations; that is judicial reputation—
“the stock of assessments about an actor’s past performance” 
(p 15)—which serves as an accurate (or “noiseless”) indicator of 
judicial quality (pp 23–24).14 
Judicial reputation is complicated, however, by the context in 
which it is created and experienced. The authors explain that rep-
utation is both individual and collective (p 22). Individual reput-
ation is held by the judge while collective reputation is held by 
the court. However, the authors argue that individual reputation 
and collective reputation are not independent because courts op-
erate as teams (p 22). This team production feature ties the rep-
utation of judges together. As the authors put it, the “size of the 
pie to be divided among individual judges” is determined by col-
lective reputation (p 23). As a result, judges care about both indi-
vidual and collective reputation. 
The principal-agent model explains why the principal—the 
public—will rely on reputation to monitor judges. And it also ac-
counts for why judges will be attentive to their personal reputa-
tions as well as to their courts’ reputations, because of the latter’s 
role in the evaluation of the individual judge’s work (pp 24–25). 
But the principal-agent model does not fully explain the system 
of incentives and disincentives that also drives Garoupa and 
Ginsburg’s reputation theory. In order to bring those into their 
theory, the authors look to the role of institutional design (p 29). 
 
 14 A high-powered incentive system would be one in which the rewards for judges are 
tied much more closely to their performance. For example, judges might get specific re-
wards based on whether the ruling elite liked their decisions in individual cases. 
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The authors provide what can be characterized as a new institu-
tional account.15 
Institutional theory posits that individual behavior is a prod-
uct of institutional constraints. Institutional structures impact 
political behavior. Institutional theories of judicial behavior adopt 
the rational actor assumption that judges seek to achieve their 
individual preferences but argue that judges, in order to attain 
their policy preferences, must and do consider the preferences and 
likely actions of other relevant actors.16 Hence, institutional theo-
rists emphasize the influence of strategic factors, such as interac-
tions with other judges (internal dynamics)17 or reactions of exter-
nal actors, most notably those with some power over judges’ work 
(exogenous constraints).18 
Garoupa and Ginsburg use the insights of institutional theory 
to explain the dynamics surrounding certain judicial actions. For 
example, the authors analyze the decision to dissent (pp 30–35). A 
judge may dissent to gain individual reputation. But dissents can 
be costly in terms of the effort required to write them and the pos-
sibility of creating friction with colleagues. Judges, therefore, will 
be more likely to dissent when they may influence subsequent de-
velopment of the law (p 31). But the dissent also poses costs within 
the court and may even harm the court’s collective reputation as a 
decisionmaking body. During Marshall’s leadership, the Supreme 
Court wrote with a single voice in order to maximize the collective 
reputation of the federal judiciary at a time when courts were not 
held in high regard (pp 32–33). In Garoupa and Ginsburg’s ac-
count of separate opinion writing, judges use institutional design 
governing separate opinions in order to maximize reputation 
 
 15 See James G. March and Johan P. Olsen, The New Institutionalism: Organiza-
tional Factors in Political Life, 78 Am Polit Sci Rev 734, 741–42 (1984) (describing indi-
vidual behavior as “driven by rules within a political structure” and explaining the role of 
“institutional rules”). 
 16 For a collection of institutional accounts of courts, see generally Cornell W. Clayton 
and Howard Gillman, eds, Supreme Court Decision-Making: New Institutionalist Approaches 
(Chicago 1999). 
 17 See, for example, Tracey E. George, The Dynamics and Determinants of the Deci-
sion to Grant En Banc Review, 74 Wash L Rev 213, 272–73 (1999) (concluding that an 
appellate court’s decision to hear a case en banc is primarily influenced by factors internal 
to the court system). 
 18 See, for example, William N. Eskridge Jr, Reneging on History? Playing the 
Court/Congress/President Civil Rights Game, 79 Cal L Rev 613, 664–66 (1991) (discuss-
ing the dynamic interaction between the Supreme Court, the president, and Congress). 
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(p 33).19 They offer a similar consideration of rules governing oral 
argument, appeals, case selection, pay, judicial discipline, and 
other basic features of courts (pp 29–44). 
To summarize, the theoretical structure Garoupa and Ginsburg 
posit is a dynamic one. On one side of the dynamic, the social plan-
ner sets up judicial institutions as a function of local contexts 
(needs, preferences, capabilities, etc.) so that the desire for certain 
types of reputation will push the agents within the system to work 
effectively (p 49). On the flip side though, the types of reputations 
that the judges already have and the degree to which they are 
concerned about maintaining these reputations (and even im-
proving them) will be crucial variables to help the social planner 
determine which institutional structures are optimal.20 
B. Empirical Examination 
The authors seek to demonstrate the role of reputation 
through the different mechanisms theorized using political eco-
nomic and institutional accounts. They explicate their theory by 
applying it to a set of specific issues that most judicial systems 
have to face, such as the extent to which judges should be permit-
ted to take on nonjudicial roles (pp 75–97), the uses of judicial 
merit commissions (pp 98–140), the effects of the increased glob-
alization of law (pp 167–78), the proliferation of rankings of the 
rule of law (pp 175–78), and the interaction of courts within a 
country (pp 141–66). The tools used to explore the issues they flag 
largely fall into the category of case studies. 
Legal scholarship is principally motivated by a desire to sit-
uate individual cases selected based on some shared characteris-
tic into a coherent argument. In the current book, the cases do 
essentially the same work. Garoupa and Ginsburg begin their first 
substantive chapter with the US Supreme Court decision in 2000 
that decided the presidential election between then-Governor 
George W. Bush and Vice President Al Gore (p 14). They note Jus-
tice Sandra Day O’Connor’s subsequent assessment that the 
Court should have stayed out of the process because of the harm 
 
 19 For a similar conception of separate opinions, see, for example, Virginia A. Hettinger, 
Stefanie A. Lindquist, and Wendy L. Martinek, Judging on a Collegial Court: Influences on 
Federal Appellate Decision Making 109–17 (Virginia 2006). 
 20 See, for example, pp 17, 49, 74 (noting both that the structures of institutions im-
pact the texture of reputation that is generated within them and that the type of reputa-
tion that a system already has—and the preferences of the judges within it—impacts 
choices about modifications that need to be made to the system). 
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the decision did to the Court’s reputation (p 14). Like the Obama-
care decision and the Knox trial, Bush v Gore21 is only one of a 
number of individual cases used by the authors to support their 
arguments, but it is the best suited to their theory. And it shows 
the value of using individual cases to explain difficult concepts 
and persuade the audience. But the choice of case also reveals 
how the American judicial system—in particular federal courts 
and, even more specifically, the US Supreme Court—frames the 
reputation theory here even as the authors strive for a compara-
tive theory. 
Garoupa and Ginsburg undertake a comparative institu-
tional analysis to separate out the effects of individual reputation 
from the effects of collective reputation on courts. They argue that 
“career” judiciaries emphasize collective reputation whereas 
“recognition” judiciaries emphasize individual reputation (pp 29–
30). The form of judiciary influences the structure of the judicial 
system, which in turn reinforces the type of reputation that dom-
inates. To understand how this works, the authors compare the 
United States and Japan, which have historically selected judges 
in very different ways, reflecting cultural and political differences 
between the countries and sharply different judicial practices 
(pp 44–48). Japan has a career judiciary reflecting cultural norms 
favoring collective quality over individual status. The Japanese 
career system is bureaucratic, selects its members at a young age 
when they do not have strong outside reputations of their own, 
and thereafter deemphasizes individuality and hence individual 
reputation (p 45). And Japanese court practices also favor collec-
tive reputation by relying on unsigned opinions and rotating as-
signments such that judges (as opposed to courts) have little 
meaningful external identity (p 45). The United States, by con-
trast, has relied on a “recognition system” of judicial selection, ac-
cording to Garoupa and Ginsburg; that is, judges are chosen in 
recognition of individual accomplishment (pp 44–45). All of the 
many methods of judicial selection in the American states are 
based on a concept of individual merit, whether evaluated by vot-
ers at the polls, elected officials at appointment, or a merit com-
mission on selection (pp 44–45). American judges often have sig-
nificant reputations even before they take on their judicial roles 
and subsequently sign opinions, are visible in media coverage of 
 
 21 531 US 98 (2000) (reversing the Florida Supreme Court’s order allowing a manual 
recount in the 2000 presidential election). 
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cases, and stake out specific positions in their rulings and public 
appearances (pp 44–45). Interestingly, both countries have in re-
cent years experienced a shift in which American judges are in-
creasingly on a judicial career path22 and Japanese judges are in-
creasingly identified based on external evaluation (pp 47–48). 
The usual explanation for whether countries have a recogni-
tion or career judiciary is history or “tradition.” The authors chal-
lenge the legal-tradition narrative by examining judicial “pock-
ets”—exceptions to the general system in place in a specific 
jurisdiction (pp 50–53, 59). The presence of outliers undermines 
the historical inevitability at the heart of the legal-tradition ac-
count. France is a civil-law system that has a career judiciary. But 
its commercial courts are staffed by elected lay people (p 55). The 
United States is a common-law system that has a recognition ju-
diciary. But its administrative law and military judges represent 
a career judiciary operating like the system in Japan (pp 57–58). 
These exceptions not only undercut legal-tradition theory, they 
also demonstrate the explanatory power of the principal-agent 
model when applied to courts (pp 59–65). Career judiciaries are 
better suited to administrative adjudication, in which the princi-
pal concern is moral hazard (p 62). Constitutional adjudication is 
better served by recognition judiciaries, because judges are cho-
sen based on proxies for the judges’ preferences (and their align-
ment with society’s preferences) and judges disclose more infor-
mation about their preferences (initially) and about their 
decisions (subsequently) (pp 54, 61). 
In the US federal system and nearly all American states, a 
single court serves as the court of last resort in the jurisdiction 
and has both constitutional and nonconstitutional authority 
(p 147). By contrast, many other countries have constitutional 
courts separate from their courts of last resort (p 141). The con-
stitutional court is staffed by politically appointed judges, while 
law courts are staffed by career judges (pp 53–54). That method 
of selection is consistent with the principal-agent account dis-
cussed above. But that account does not consider the interaction 
between the two high courts and their competition for jurisdiction 
and power. Reputation theory hypothesizes that the two high 
courts, even though they are in the same country, will develop 
different procedures and norms. For example, the constitutional 
 
 22 One indication of this is the increasing tendency in the US federal courts to make 
promotions, and particularly so vis-à-vis the high court, from within the system. See, for ex-
ample, Epstein, Landes, and Posner, Behavior of Federal Judges at 337–41 (cited in note 11). 
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court will be more fragmented, with separate opinions and an em-
phasis on individual reputation, while the supreme court will be 
more uniform, operating by consensus and creating collective rep-
utation (pp 146–49). The authors capitalize on the differences to 
examine the interaction between constitutional courts and su-
preme courts within twenty-two countries that have both 
(pp 154–74). They find that the greater the disagreement within 
a constitutional court, the higher the probability of conflict be-
tween the constitutional court and the supreme court (p 155). 
While the sample size is admittedly too small to draw strong con-
clusions, the authors strengthen their claim of a causal relation-
ship by focusing on specific instances of conflict (pp 156–64). 
Most judicial systems, and perhaps all, constrain judges from 
engaging in at least some nonjudicial activities (p 76). This con-
straint, the authors argue, can be understood from the perspec-
tive of reputational theory. Judiciaries, the argument goes, build 
reputations over time—specifically, reputations for matters such 
as impartiality, honesty, and the ability to sort out complicated 
facts and get close to the truth (p 81). Actors outside the judiciary, 
then, have an incentive to see whether they can take advantage 
of this built-up reputation for their nonjudicial purposes, by hir-
ing the judges for jobs that require a credible signal of matters 
such as honesty and credibility (p 83). These jobs can include 
things such as running private arbitration, being on a board of 
directors, serving on an investigative commission, and even tak-
ing high political office (p 79). The risk that the foregoing poses, 
though, is that judges will undermine the carefully and painstak-
ingly built reputation of the judicial system by pursuing private 
gain that takes advantage of what is supposed to be a public good 
(pp 82–83). And that, the authors argue, is why judicial systems 
around the globe tend to constrain nonjudicial activities (pp 76–
78, 96–97). 
C. Prescriptions 
Garoupa and Ginsburg embrace the responsibility to make 
meaningful policy recommendations based on what they have 
learned about how courts function. Their commitment to norma-
tive relevance is one of the many strengths of their book. Their 
approach to understanding courts informs their prescriptions. 
They contend that we can improve our courts by simultaneously 
incentivizing strong individual performance and encouraging ef-
fective collaboration (pp 188–97). 
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Garoupa and Ginsburg mention several possible reforms that 
would induce greater individual effort, including variable pay, 
transparency, and a market for judges (pp 191–93). “In an ideal 
world,” they say, “we would compensate judges for their marginal 
contribution to judicial reputation” (p 190). But variable compen-
sation has several theoretical as well as proven difficulties. Meas-
uring an individual judge’s performance is the most obvious chal-
lenge, but probably not the most difficult. As we have seen in other 
settings, pay for performance can undermine contributions to team 
effort and erode professionalism (pp 190–91). And, despite some 
apparent success in a limited, historical setting in England, pay-
for-performance efforts in other countries have been heavily crit-
icized (pp 190–91). While acknowledging these issues, Garoupa 
and Ginsburg make a plea for more study of how compensation 
structures can encourage healthy competition (p 192). They also 
suggest that jurisdictions should consider allowing direct compe-
tition among judges. Judges could, for example, be allowed to ad-
vertise their relative virtues to forum-shopping parties (p 192). 
Courts could also create special panels or assignments for which 
judges could compete internally (pp 192–93). We already see this 
practice in the United States, where, for example, federal judges 
position themselves for selection as a transferee judge in multi-
district litigation23 or as a member of a special assignment court 
or judicial conference committee.24 
The authors also weigh possible reforms for inducing greater 
collective effort, including random de novo appeal (pp 193–94), a 
transnational market for judges (pp 194–95), enhanced judicial 
disciplinary systems (“[c]leaning [h]ouse”) (pp 195–96), and active 
management of the media (pp 196–97). Random audits are rou-
tinely done across industries and activities. The authors argue 
that even though they can find no record of its use in courts, ran-
dom de novo review of a sample of cases could serve much the 
same purpose in the judicial system as it serves elsewhere (p 194). 
They also consider the suggestion of Professors Jens Dammann 
and Henry Hansmann that, in essence, justice-rich countries 
should be able to rent their judges to justice-poor countries 
 
 23 See Margaret S. Williams and Tracey E. George, Who Will Manage Complex Civil 
Litigation? The Decision to Transfer and Consolidate Multidistrict Litigation, 10 J Empir-
ical Legal Stud 424, 440, 449–57 (2013). 
 24 See generally Tracey E. George and Margaret S. Williams, Venue Shopping: The 
Judges of the U.S. Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation, 97 Judicature 196 (2014); 
Dawn M. Chutkow, The Chief Justice as Executive: Judicial Conference Committee Ap-
pointments, 2 J L & Cts 301 (2014). 
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(p 194).25 This would create a global market for courts, in which 
adjudication is the product and reputation is the measure of 
value. The benefits could be similar to those gained from open 
borders for other types of products. 
In sum, the authors contend that reputation is a positive as-
pect of judicial institutions because reputation allows judges to 
provide information to audiences and allows outsiders to monitor 
judges (pp 187–88). Therefore, greater transparency, strong judi-
cial disciplinary systems, and competition among judges would be 
beneficial as they would allow more information about the quality 
of judges and courts to be shared and create greater confidence in 
courts themselves. 
II.  EVALUATING AND TESTING THE CORE CLAIM 
The authors’ core argument, as we see it, has three crucial 
steps. First, judicial systems need to have a high reputation in 
order to function effectively because judges will, for many of their 
most important decisions, lack police or military power to ensure 
enforcement of their dictates (p 3). Or, even if they have access to 
military or police power, they will risk losing it to the extent they 
are prosecuting the people with authority over those branches of 
the state.26 Second, the type of system—whether it emphasizes in-
dividual judicial reputations, collective ones, or some hybrid—
that will generate the kind of reputation that the state in question 
needs will differ depending on context (pp 16–17). And, finally, so-
cial planners (who represent the populace), understanding these 
considerations, will make choices about how to structure their ju-
dicial systems as a function of what type of reputation is needed to 
maximize social welfare at any given point in time (p 17). 
Professors Garoupa and Ginsburg’s claim is a departure from 
how most scholars think about the structural features of judiciar-
ies, which is primarily as a function of historical happenstance at 
the starting point eons ago and inertia for the many intervening 
decades since then (p 18). Change, to the extent it ever occurs, is 
glacial. Historical origins, inertia, and path dependence, though, 
are but bit players in the story that Garoupa and Ginsburg tell; 
 
 25 See generally Jens Dammann and Henry Hansmann, Globalizing Commercial Lit-
igation, 94 Cornell L Rev 1 (2008). 
 26 The ongoing prosecutions of key members of the ruling political party in Brazil, 
driven largely by the efforts of a single judge, are a vivid illustration of this tension. See 
Bruce Douglas and Sam Cowie, Brazil: Judge Halts Lula’s Appointment to Cabinet amid 
Corruption Scandal (The Guardian, Mar 17, 2016), archived at http://perma.cc/76UF-7V72. 
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for them, the structures of judiciaries can and should be primarily 
understood through a functional lens—specifically, the lens of 
maximizing the type of reputation the judicial system in question 
most needs (pp 8–9). 
Garoupa and Ginsburg deserve enormous credit for advanc-
ing a new paradigm—that judicial institutions around the world 
are structured and modified largely as a function of their needs 
for particular types of reputation—and calling into question the 
legal origins or path-dependence school of thought. And even if 
one does not buy their theoretical frame one bit, their book is a 
delightful read in terms of its thick description of the various 
characteristics of judicial systems around the world. The discus-
sions in the chapters on judges engaging in nonjudicial activities 
(pp 75–97), the varying uses of judicial councils (pp 98–140), the 
reasons for the rise and proliferation of constitutional courts 
(pp 141–66), the increasing relevance of cross-country rankings of 
judicial quality (pp 167–86), and the varying uses of modern me-
dia to brand the court system (pp 196–97) are all gems in their 
own right. Further, the book is full of rich country-specific de-
scriptions from Japan, Spain, Italy, Canada, Pakistan, and more 
that will be new to many readers (most were new to us). 
Being academics, we of course have our quibbles, but they are 
more accurately put as requests to the authors that they consider 
explicating and extending their work in certain directions that 
might help further their project. 
A. A Fuller Theory, Please 
Where the book falls short for us is in failing to articulate a 
theoretical frame strong enough to generate a wide range of test-
able hypotheses. To be fair, Garoupa and Ginsburg are clear in 
their introduction that they are not setting out a testable theory; 
instead, theirs is more of a description (p 13). But to give them a 
pass on that would be too easy, especially because they have an 
intriguing theoretical claim and it should be possible to articulate 
it in a parsimonious-enough fashion such that it can be subject to 
testing. As we see it, the theory could be sharpened on two defini-
tional fronts: (1) the meaning of reputation within the Garoupa 
and Ginsburg framework; and (2) how it varies (in terms of what 
type is needed) by context. 
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1. Theorizing reputation. 
Garoupa and Ginsburg state at the outset that reputation is 
“the stock of judgments about an actor’s past behavior” (p 4). But 
judgments about what? And whose judgments? A court that 
builds the right kind of reputation, Garoupa and Ginsburg ex-
plain, is more effective—it has greater credibility and its dictates 
are followed (pp 2, 16). And one can imagine a self-fulfilling dy-
namic in which courts that have high reputations can do their 
work with less and less need for monitoring and policing expense 
and take more risks with their decisions in trying to make rules 
that improve social welfare, which all in turn enables even better 
and cheaper decisionmaking (and ultimately puts the system on a 
high-growth path). But we cannot test the Garoupa and Ginsburg 
claim unless they provide a measurable definition of reputation 
(which in turn would require defining the relevant audience 
whose judgments are to be measured).27 And this, we think, 
should not be an impossible task—particularly given the theoret-
ical claims being made about the importance of reputation in de-
termining the effectiveness of judicial systems. We note two rea-
sons why below. 
First, take the theoretical claim about the importance of rep-
utation. There is a well-established literature from scholars like 
Professors Lisa Bernstein,28 Robert Ellickson,29 Avner Greif,30 
Barak Richman,31 and others on how, in certain contexts, formal 
legal sanctions and top-down monitoring can be unnecessary be-
cause of the effective operation of nonlegal sanctions. These sto-
ries are, in effect, stories about how reputation-based systems can 
work effectively. And, as we see it, Garoupa and Ginsburg are in 
effect making the argument that reputation can play a similar 
role within judicial systems (albeit on a far larger scale than any 
of the aforementioned authors tried). The key to all of those sto-
ries of the effective operation of reputation in holding a system 
together, though, was the high quality of information that was 
 
 27 Garoupa and Ginsburg are explicit about not wanting to specify a core reputation 
function (p 16). 
 28 See generally Lisa Bernstein, Private Commercial Law in the Cotton Industry: Cre-
ating Cooperation through Rules, Norms, and Institutions, 99 Mich L Rev 1724 (2001). 
 29 See generally Robert C. Ellickson, Unpacking the Household: Informal Property 
Rights around the Hearth, 116 Yale L J 226 (2006). 
 30 See generally Avner Greif, Reputation and Coalitions in Medieval Trade: Evidence 
on the Maghribi Traders, 49 J Econ Hist 857 (1989). 
 31 See generally Barak D. Richman, How Community Institutions Create Economic 
Advantage: Jewish Diamond Merchants in New York, 31 J L & Soc Inquiry 383 (2006). 
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available to all the relevant players.32 And, logically we think, if 
there is high-quality information available to all, then reputation 
should be measurable. Or, put differently, for a reputation-based 
system to work effectively, participants have to be able to calcu-
late reputation. And that in turn should mean that it is easily 
measurable, at least for local participants, and, therefore, per-
haps even for external observers. In small communities of trad-
ers, for example, one indicator of an individual’s loss of reputation 
is often the refusal of others to trade with that person or to engage 
in large (valuable) trades with her.33 Or it might be something 
more idiosyncratic, such as the denial of entry into the local tem-
ple.34 For small groups in which reputation matters crucially for 
the internal sanction mechanisms to work, it has to be possible 
for members of the group to easily identify those who have lost 
reputation (and conversely those who have gained it). Likewise, 
if reputation is crucial to the operation of courts, then judges (and 
interested local audiences such as lawyers and politicians) must 
be able to evaluate changes in a judge’s reputation. 
Second, as a positive matter, the most common kind of repu-
tation Garoupa and Ginsburg seem to be talking about—the one 
that gives courts legitimacy in the eyes of the public—is of the 
kind that comes from being willing to stop the state from harming 
those who lack power.35 This is a measurable characteristic. If the 
populace has good information about whether their judiciary is 
likely to stop those in the executive branch or the military from 
 
 32 The literature in question is too large to justify citing all of its key pieces. For an 
overview of the relevant dynamics, though, see, for example, Barak D. Richman, Firms, 
Courts, and Reputation Mechanisms: Towards a Positive Theory of Private Ordering, 104 
Colum L Rev 2328, 2333–37 (2004). 
 33 See Bernstein, 99 Mich L Rev at 1764 (cited in note 28) (noting that “breach of 
contract as to one transactor is transformed into breach of contract as to numerous market 
transactors for the purposes of a transactor’s commercial reputation”). 
 34 See, for example, Richman, 31 J L & Soc Inquiry at 407 n 59 (cited in note 31). 
 35 Although the example above is that of the judiciary standing up to the state in a 
manner that is welfare enhancing, there can also be instances in which the judiciary tries 
to block state action in a fashion that is welfare reducing. The actions of the US Supreme 
Court in the so-called Lochner (pre–New Deal) era are seen by many as such a case. For a 
description, see generally Noah Feldman, Scorpions: The Battles and Triumphs of FDR’s 
Great Supreme Court Justices (Twelve 2010). More generally, there is a large literature on 
what kind of judicial behavior vis-à-vis the government in power gives the judiciary legit-
imacy in the eyes of the public (and therefore power of its own). See, for example, Georg 
Vanberg, Constitutional Courts in Comparative Perspective: A Theoretical Assessment, 18 
Ann Rev Polit Sci 167, 179–81 (2015) (discussing the role of strategic judicial behavior in 
interactions with other branches of government); Rafael La Porta, et al, Judicial Checks 
and Balances, 112 J Polit Econ 445, 457–58, 468 (2004) (analyzing the link between judi-
cial independence, constitutional review, and economic freedom). 
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overreaching their authority, and is confident in that belief, that 
should be measurable via surveys—after all, the claim is that pop-
ulations do have this kind of information and that their having 
this kind of information matters for the effective working of the 
system. Further, if one wanted to get more fine-grained, one could 
try to measure public perceptions of the quality of decisionmak-
ing, which would include matters such as speed of disputation, as 
well—and this also seems to be important to the Garoupa and 
Ginsburg analysis (pp 23, 187–88). The quality of decisionmaking 
of courts or judges could be, and is already, measured in a variety 
of ways (citations to decisions by other courts, surveys of litigants, 
and so on).36 The bottom line is that a sharper definition of reputa-
tion is necessary, even if multiple kinds of reputation need to be 
specified. That in turn will enable testing, something that Garoupa 
and Ginsburg presumably want for their ambitious theory. 
2. Describing the boxes. 
Assuming now that Garoupa and Ginsburg were to clarify the 
different kinds of reputations that they have in mind and how to 
measure them, the next specification question in their model is 
which types of contexts require which types of reputation. This 
second specification is needed because the core of the Garoupa 
and Ginsburg claim is that judicial structures are (1) initially cho-
sen and (2) subsequently modified over time as a function of the 
system’s need for different types of reputation (pp 50–53). The re-
sponse that Garoupa and Ginsburg might give is that the answer 
depends on context, and that different social, economic, and polit-
ical contexts require the relevant judiciaries to pursue different 
types of reputations (pp 17–18, 189). But surely Garoupa and 
Ginsburg can give us some boxes or broad categorizations. 
For example, do countries or regions with highly educated 
and secular populations, and with income levels above a certain 
amount, tend to find judiciaries more legitimate if they provide 
their judgments in individualized and nuanced ways? Would, for 
example, a 5–4 decision of the type that was handed down in Bush 
have undermined confidence in the judiciary to a sufficient extent 
to cause a structural breakdown if it had happened in a different 
context than the United States in 2000? Similarly, perhaps there 
 
 36 There is a growing, albeit still small, literature on measuring judges and justice. 
See Jeffrey M. Chemerinsky and Jonathan L. Williams, Note, Foreword: Measuring 
Judges and Justice, 58 Duke L J 1173, 1175–79 (2009) (describing empirical research on 
judges and judicial decisionmaking). 
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is a set of conditions under which Garoupa and Ginsburg would 
predict that a population would give more legitimacy points to a 
judiciary that provides collectivized decisions, without any nu-
ance or dissension, than it would to a judiciary that showed dis-
sension among the individual judges. They seem to hint as much, 
to our reading, but do not sketch out the categories or boxes of 
circumstances. 
Once those different boxes or sets of stylized circumstances 
are set forth, Garoupa and Ginsburg could then explain, drawing 
from their theory, why those particular contexts call for particular 
types of reputation-generating structures. For example, is there 
a prediction regarding the kind of reputation a judicial system 
needs in a newly formed nation that has not inherited, from its 
prior incarnation, well-established institutions? And does this 
need vary as a function of the degree of overall wealth or wealth 
disparities or racial and ethnic diversity in a society? 
Another set of factors that might impact an audience’s inter-
pretation of a court’s decision has to do with the structural fea-
tures of the court. Garoupa and Ginsburg, as we read them, would 
say that an individualistic system like the US Supreme Court will 
produce a different level of reputation than a collective system 
like the European Court of Justice (pp 28–44, 180–81). At first 
cut, this seems intuitively right. There are surely going to be sit-
uations—for example, when the court is telling the public that the 
government in question is illegitimate and needs to leave office 
because the evidence shows that it rigged elections—in which the 
public would like the members of the court (regardless of political 
preferences) to speak with one voice. And in a context in which 
these kinds of decisions need to be made frequently by the judici-
ary (perhaps a country with a weak rule-of-law culture and a high 
level of governmental corruption), one might jump to the conclu-
sion that the judiciary should be constrained to speak with one 
voice. However, if one scratches the surface, it is not clear that 
that is the case. 
Take a court whose judges often disagree and speak sepa-
rately, with starkly differing views. If and when these judges are 
in unanimity about something, the public will notice—and partic-
ularly so if it is a matter of great public importance (like the need 
to throw out an illegitimate government). But is the public going 
to notice, or take any special meaning, from the fact that the 
judges are speaking in unison if the rules require that they do? 
We suspect that the message—and the reputational impact—of a 
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court’s members speaking in unison will be close to zero if the 
court is mandated to speak with a single voice. Indeed, the differ-
ential reputational value of speaking in unison versus individu-
ally probably occurs only in systems in which the judges have the 
option to do either. In that context, the choice that the judges 
make sends a message. If the judges have no choice, then there is 
no message from the choice to speak with one voice. 
And even if a court were speaking in unison in a context in 
which the judges have the option to speak individually, it is by no 
means clear what the message would be. Dissenting requires ef-
fort cost. Overworked courts lack time and enthusiasm for extra 
work. Thus, busy judges will write fewer dissents than nonbusy 
judges regardless of the level of underlying disagreement in their 
respective courts.37 In the context of a judiciary that is overbur-
dened with work, speaking in unison might just be an indicator of 
the fact that the judges cannot handle their work as a group and 
have just agreed to agree even when they disagree so that the work 
can get handled more effectively. In the high-workload context, 
though, the occasions when the judges speak individually could 
plausibly be interpreted by their audiences as more meaningful. 
The point of the foregoing is that unless one has a theory of 
why and how the relevant audience interprets judicial or court 
behavior, one cannot build a meaningful theory of judicial repu-
tation—at least not one that is amenable to empirical testing. We 
want more meat on the bones of the core Garoupa and Ginsburg 
theory in order to run a horse race between it and the historical 
origins or inertia theory in terms of which one can better predict 
what we see in judicial systems around the world. More than 
that, it would help to understand how and why the Garoupa and 
Ginsburg theory is different from existing institutional theories 
of judicial behavior and structures.38 Institutional analysis of the 
kind articulated by Professors Lee Epstein and Jack Knight in 
their classic book, The Choices Justices Make, would likely ex-
plain Chief Justice Roberts’s decision to vote to uphold the Afford-
able Care Act in very much the same manner that Garoupa and 
Ginsburg do in their opening two pages: as a strategic decision 
 
 37 For an analysis of the relationship between workload and dissent rates, see gen-
erally Lee Epstein, William M. Landes, and Richard A. Posner, Why (and When) Judges 
Dissent: A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis, 3 J Legal Analysis 101 (2011). 
 38 Garoupa and Ginsburg describe their work as fitting within the institutional-
analysis rubric (p 7). Their modification of the standard model, though, is emphasizing 
the paramount importance of reputation. 
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born out of a concern about preserving the court’s position vis-à-
vis the other branches of government and the public (pp 1–2).39 
The difference between the Epstein and Knight variety of institu-
tional theory and the Garoupa and Ginsburg version, though, as 
we understand it, is the emphasis that Garoupa and Ginsburg put 
on reputation. But the two sets of theories are indistinguishable 
unless Garoupa and Ginsburg provide a sharper and more precise 
definition of reputation that shows how their theory explains and 
predicts in a different fashion from the more traditional institu-
tional analysis. 
Below, we try to set out some ways in which the theory might 
be better specified and tested. First though, we think there is an-
other gap in the theoretical frame that needs to be filled: the ques-
tion of judicial motivation within the model. 
B. Where Are the Judges (and What Motivates Them)? 
Missing from the Garoupa and Ginsburg framework is a 
theory of judicial behavior and, in particular, a story about what 
motivates judges to pursue reputation at an individual level. (And 
this is where we need to know more about what reputation is.) 
This is a significant gap in their story because most judicial sys-
tems around the world, almost by definition, need to be given a 
significant degree of independence and discretion (effectively, 
protection from oversight). The flip side of independence, how-
ever, is that judges have considerable room to misbehave. But as-
suming—we think plausibly—that they do not misbehave, at 
least not to the same extent that most people probably would if 
given that level of job security, there is a puzzle: Why do judges 
work as much and as well as they do, given that they have con-
siderable leeway to shirk and misbehave? 
When we began reading Garoupa and Ginsburg, we thought 
that maybe they were going to use the desire for reputation as the 
key to explaining why judges behave well, despite the relative 
lack of constraints on them. The reason this is important, given 
their claims about the overall importance of reputation as a driv-
ing force for judicial system design, is that their system depends 
 
 39 See Lee Epstein and Jack Knight, The Choices Justices Make 138–39 (CQ 1998). 
For an explication of the Epstein and Knight model of judicial behavior, which views 
judges as acting strategically in response to a variety of audiences who have power over 
them while also seeking to advance personal policy preferences, see Frank B. Cross, Book 
Review, The Justices of Strategy, 48 Duke L J 511, 511–31 (1998). 
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on the individual actors within it acting in the pursuit of reputa-
tion (either individualistic or collective), without significant car-
rots or sticks to make them do that. So, for their overall claims to 
be plausible, they need to tell a persuasive story about why it is 
not only in the interest of the system designers to structure judi-
cial institutions to generate reputation, but why it is plausible to 
think that the soldiers within these institutions (the judges) will 
act in ways that help achieve the system designers’ goals. 
Our pointing out this gap in the analysis is meant as a 
friendly amendment. As a starting point, it is not plausible to us 
that judges might be more motivated by reputation than most of 
the rest of us. That is, such a claim is not plausible unless a good 
case could be made that social planners had constructed judicial-
selection systems to select individuals who would not only be in-
trinsically motivated, but also motivated by the pursuit of repu-
tation. And this cannot be any reputation, but the kind of reputa-
tion for high-legitimacy or high-quality decisionmaking that 
Garoupa and Ginsburg are positing. If this is plausible though, 
that would put the onus on Garoupa and Ginsburg to delve deeper 
into judicial-selection systems and tell a plausible story about 
how these systems operate in a manner consistent with their rep-
utation story. 
So, if one takes the different US states that have considerable 
variation in terms of how they select local judges (elections, merit se-
lection, and a range of structures in between) (pp 100–01), Garoupa 
and Ginsburg should be able to tell a story for (1) the differences 
in the types of reputations different states might need as a function 
of context, and (2) why the variation in judicial-selection systems 
within the United States helps produce those different types of rep-
utation. And then, even better, they should be able to show that 
when the context within a state changes (for example, when a state 
goes from having a relatively racially homogeneous population 
with an agricultural base for its economy to a relatively racially 
diverse population that has technology as its economic core), the 
judicial-selection systems also change.40 
As noted earlier, though, Garoupa and Ginsburg’s theoretical 
frame will need to be better specified for it to be used in a horse 
 
 40 Garoupa and Ginsburg hint at being able to tell such an evolutionary story in their 
discussion of how the norms of the US Supreme Court have fluctuated over time from 
being individualistic (seriatim opinions initially) to collective (the norm against individual 
opinions under Chief Justice Marshall) and then back to more individual opinions (under 
Chief Justice Harlan Fiske Stone) (pp 32–33). 
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race against the standard inertia explanation for why state judi-
cial systems are the way they are. 
C. A Possible Testing Ground 
Garoupa and Ginsburg present the US federal judiciary as 
the paradigm of an individualized judiciary and compare it to the 
more bureaucratized judicial systems in much of the rest of the 
world (p 28). We have no complaint with that perspective; one of 
the best aspects of the book for those of us who focus mostly on 
the US judicial system is the exposure to an analysis of a number 
of foreign legal systems by two leading comparatists. What we 
want to suggest, though, is that Garoupa and Ginsburg’s model 
might be usefully tested, and perhaps pushed further, if it were 
to be applied to a part of the US judiciary that goes largely un-
mentioned in their book—the state judicial systems. 
In the frame of Garoupa and Ginsburg’s book, the US federal 
judiciary sits at the highly individualized end of a continuum that 
has career judiciaries, such as those in France and Japan, at the 
other end (p 28). But the spectrum can perhaps be extended in the 
other direction as well. Specifically, if compared to the US state 
judicial system, in which judges in many states are elected, the 
US federal judiciary looks to be more of a careerist or bureaucratic 
system (pp 100–01). After all, a judge who has to individually 
stand for election every few years has to make sure to develop a 
very different type of reputation with the voting public (arguably, 
a thicker and more locally oriented reputation) than a federal 
judge who for the most part will be largely unknown by the local 
public. The question, then, is whether Garoupa and Ginsburg’s 
functional theory can help explain why different states in the 
United States have their particular elected, quasi-elected, or non-
elected judicial systems. If it can, Garoupa and Ginsburg will 
have exploded a standard assumption regarding the reason for 
why so many states in the United States have elected or quasi-
elected judiciaries, which is that they are a product of a populist 
move in the early days of the nation and that once the structure 
was set it was extremely difficult to change.41 
The foregoing assumption is one that many in the large liter-
ature on elected versus appointed judiciaries are particularly fond 
 
 41 Historical facts, of course, suggest a story that is more complicated that the simple 
populism or history explanation. See Caleb Nelson, A Re-evaluation of Scholarly Explana-
tions for the Rise of the Elective Judiciary in Antebellum America, 37 Am J Legal Hist 190, 
203–10 (1993). 
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of for perhaps functional reasons. For those on the policy side, 
who are writing diatribes about why elected and quasi-elected ju-
diciaries are obviously bad, the claim that these were the product 
of some bizarre historical anomaly is convenient in that it fits the 
claim that no one in their right mind would ever want an elected 
judiciary.42 Academic empiricists studying the age-old question 
whether elected or appointed judiciaries are best for society are, for 
their part, also fond of this assumption because it means they can 
assume that the state system in question was put in place inde-
pendent of any functional reason (therefore enabling them to jus-
tify not having to do empirical corrections for the dreaded endoge-
neity problem).43 For our purposes, what the foregoing means is 
that if Garoupa and Ginsburg (or their successors) can show that 
the functional explanation better explains why state systems are 
the way they are, that will call into question a whole host of empir-
ical studies of the state judiciaries in the United States. And that 
would be quite exciting. And as an aside, we suspect that a deeper 
understanding of the state systems might be arrived at if examined 
through Garoupa and Ginsburg’s functional lens. That lens says 
that if one looks closely enough at the various judicial systems that 
are supposed to be structured the way they are because of histori-
cal happenstance combined with inertia (pp 7–8), one can detect 
equally, if not more, plausible functional explanations. 
III.  MOTIVATING THE JUDGES (AND DOING IT BETTER) 
Given the story that Professors Garoupa and Ginsburg tell 
about how social planners design judicial institutions to pursue 
reputation, they need to also tell a story of why it is plausible to 
think that the key actors in their play, the judges, will cooperate 
in this pursuit of reputation. And this story has to come in two 
parts. In the individualistic systems, judges need an incentive to 
pursue their own personal reputations, whereas in the collective 
systems, judges need incentives to pursue the enhancement of the 
 
 42 See Thomas R. Phillips, The Merits of Merit Selection, 32 Harv J L & Pub Pol 67, 
71, 88–96 (2009) (noting that “[t]he type of system a state has depends largely on the date 
it adopted that system” and critiquing election systems in favor of merit selection systems). 
 43 See, for example, Stephen J. Choi, G. Mitu Gulati, and Eric A. Posner, Professionals 
or Politicians: The Uncertain Empirical Case for an Elected Rather than Appointed Judici-
ary, 26 J L Econ & Org 290, 303 (2010) (noting in the description of an empirical study of 
appointed versus elected judges that “the selection mechanism long predates our data pool 
and thus mitigates concerns about endogeneity—that states adopted new mechanisms in 
response to changes in judicial quality”). See also generally Alexander Tabarrok and Eric 
Helland, Court Politics: The Political Economy of Tort Awards, 42 J L & Econ 157 (1999). 
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system’s reputation and put their self-enhancement aside. The 
question then is whether we think it plausible that judges in ei-
ther system will act in these manners. 
The rub here is that there does not seem to be, in either sys-
tem, a clearly identifiable set of rewards that go to judges from 
their bosses as a reward for pursuing the relevant kind of reputa-
tion that is needed. And this is because judging, the world over, 
is almost always designed as a kind of priesthood. To become a 
judge is, for the most part, a decision to abdicate being incentiv-
ized by the things that motivate the rest of us at our jobs—more 
income and more opportunities for leisure.44 In theory, the judges 
in both systems could be motivated by the prospect of promotions 
to higher-status jobs.45 But, as best we can tell, there is no judicial 
system that Garoupa and Ginsburg have identified that makes 
promotions clearly and identifiably a function of the work that the 
judges do on the reputational front.46 
For the judges in Garoupa and Ginsburg’s model to be pursu-
ing reputation, either the individualistic or collective version, the 
incentives need to be intrinsic (or inculcated). And that then leads 
to the question whether we think it plausible that either the indi-
vidualistic or collective system selects or socializes judges to pur-
sue the relevant kinds of reputation. We briefly take each system 
in turn. 
 
 44 See Richard A. Posner, What Do Judges Maximize? (The Same Thing Everybody 
Else Does), 3 S Ct Econ Rev 1, 2 (1993) (exploring “how to explain judicial behavior in 
economic terms, when almost the whole thrust of the rules governing compensation and 
other terms and conditions of judicial employment is to divorce judicial action from incen-
tives—to take away the carrots and sticks . . . that determine human action in an economic 
model”). 
 45 Some of these basic ideas on the economics of judging are discussed in Russell 
Smyth, Do Judges Behave as Homo Economicus and, If So, Can We Measure Their Perfor-
mance? An Antipodean Perspective on a Tournament of Judges, 32 Fla St U L Rev 1299 
(2005). For examples of papers conjecturing that reputational concerns motivate judges 
and/or those with power over their careers, see generally Gilat Levy, Careerist Judges and 
the Appeals Process, 36 RAND J Econ 275 (2005); Eli Salzberger and Paul Fenn, Judicial 
Independence: Some Evidence from the English Court of Appeal, 42 J L & Econ 831 (1999); 
William M. Landes and Richard A. Posner, Legal Precedent: A Theoretical and Empirical 
Analysis, 19 J L & Econ 249 (1976). 
 46 What we mean here is a reputation for high-quality work—the kind of reputation 
that the principal in the principal-agent relationship would want. We do not mean a rep-
utation for being willing to advance the policy agenda of some politician. The latter, one 
could argue, is indeed the kind of reputation that probably does result in advancement in 
the US federal court system. For an argument that courts should, as a normative matter, 
be designed to incentivize judges to pursue the former and not the latter, see generally 
Stephen Choi and Mitu Gulati, A Tournament of Judges?, 92 Cal L Rev 299 (2004). 
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A. Plausibility of the Garoupa and Ginsburg Claim 
The individualistic system, of which the US federal judiciary 
is the prime example that Garoupa and Ginsburg use, typically 
selects judges from the practicing bar at more advanced ages, af-
ter these individuals have already been lawyers for a number of 
years (pp 44–45). If the goal was to have a set of judges who would 
embark on the pursuit of individual reputation of the type that 
Garoupa and Ginsburg posit, it would have to be that the selec-
tion system was designed to identify and select the types of indi-
viduals who were already predisposed to pursue judicial super-
stardom (regardless of whether it was plausible for them to 
achieve it). So, the question then is whether the US federal sys-
tem, Garoupa and Ginsburg’s exemplar, is designed to select in-
dividuals of this type. We would like to think so—to think that 
the politicians doing the selection are looking to select those who 
will pursue reputation—and certainly there have been some ex-
emplars such as Justice Benjamin Cardozo, Judge Richard Posner, 
Judge Henry Friendly, Judge Frank Easterbrook, Justice Oliver 
Wendell Holmes and a handful of others. And Garoupa and 
Ginsburg suggest that this is indeed the system we have; they 
see the structural feature of choosing lawyers who are midway 
through their legal careers as indicative of a system that seeks 
out the star lawyers to then make judges (pp 9, 14, 29). But as 
two researchers who have spent a great deal of time interviewing 
and studying data on US federal judges, we suspect that our poli-
ticians are not at all looking to select judges of the Cardozo, Posner, 
and Friendly type. They are the aberrations, who somehow got 
through the selection process almost by mistake. Politicians, if 
anything, do not seem to like them very much precisely because 
they have pursued judicial stardom and not the interests of the 
politicians (put differently, they turned out to be too damn inde-
pendent and too damn smart).47 Most judges on the federal bench, 
 
 47 The research on this question is thin, but what little there is does not seem to 
suggest that politicians selecting judges are looking for stars (either in terms of their will-
ingness to stand up to the government, their independence from political influence, or the 
quality of their decisions). See, for example, Stephen J. Choi, Mitu Gulati, and Eric A. 
Posner, The Role of Competence in Promotions from the Lower Federal Courts, 44 J Legal 
Stud S107, S129 (2015) (“[P]residents do not seem interested in promoting the district 
judges with the highest competence.”); Stephen J. Choi and G. Mitu Gulati, Mr. Justice 
Posner? Unpacking the Statistics, 61 NYU Ann Surv Am L 19, 42–43 (2005) (“We suspect 
that Posner himself does not think that he should be on the Supreme Court. . . . [It] is a 
highly political body.”). 
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we suspect, care very little about building their individual repu-
tations in a Cardozo-Friendly-Posner fashion; they are happy to 
do a good job, but they are not pursuing individual stardom. 
Moving to the collective-reputation systems, which we read-
ily admit we know a lot less about than the US federal system, we 
suspect that the view of judges as pursuing their reputation in 
some other-regarding or altruistic fashion is even more implausi-
ble. In these systems, Garoupa and Ginsburg explain, selection to 
the judiciary tends to be at a young age, and then judges become 
cogs in a big bureaucratic system (p 29). Nothing that we know 
about the selection systems used around the world tells us that 
the individuals selected tend to be particularly other-regarding. 
Nor do we know of any plausible accounts of how these systems 
succeed in socializing the judges at a young age to be altruistic in 
terms of pursuing the system’s collective needs and abnegating 
their own needs for self-advancement. That is, there are no plau-
sible accounts unless the systems are designed to identify and re-
ward the generation of collective reputation by individual 
judges—but we have seen no claim to that effect. 
Garoupa and Ginsburg pose their inquiry as a positive one; 
they are investigating why judiciaries are structured the way 
they are and not whether they should be structured in one way or 
the other (pp 7, 14–19). But we read an undertone of approval 
from Garoupa and Ginsburg for judicial systems that are de-
signed to pursue reputation. Elsewhere in this Review, we have 
tried to push Garoupa and Ginsburg on their positive claims. But 
even if the positive claims turn out to be theoretically flawed 
(maybe judicial systems are not designed to ensure the optimal 
amount of reputation), Garoupa and Ginsburg, in their final chap-
ter, do raise the question of whether social planners in the future 
might do well to consider reputation enhancement when they de-
sign new structures (pp 187–97). Certainly, the two of us accept 
the argument that a judiciary that has a high reputation will be 
more effective and that social planners should keep reputation 
generation in mind when designing judicial institutions and se-
lecting judges. But we are skeptical that they do that very much 
currently, anywhere. 
B. Making It Happen 
Garoupa and Ginsburg suggest some intriguing and creative 
possibilities that, to a limited extent, are already being utilized, 
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but perhaps could be utilized better to enhance judicial reputa-
tion. These include improvements to brand management, better 
use of social media by the courts and individual judges, mecha-
nisms to clean house when the entire judicial system of a country 
is corrupt, and so on (pp 195–97). The mechanism that interested 
us in particular is one that Garoupa and Ginsburg are rather 
skeptical of: the relevance of postjudgeship employment and how 
those employment opportunities might help incentivize judges, 
while they are employed as judges, to pursue the right kinds of 
reputational enhancements (pp 75–97).48 As a general matter, at 
least in the US judicial system, the phenomenon of judges retiring 
and going on to work in the private market is viewed with a de-
gree of contempt (such judges are often referred to as “rent-a-
judges”).49 But maybe judges should be encouraged to pursue such 
postjudgeship employment. Maybe it would produce good incen-
tives to generate the kind of reputation Garoupa and Ginsburg 
suggest that judiciaries should be pursuing (and we are skepti-
cal that they are). Below, we mention three sets of jobs judges 
might take (we draw these examples in part from Garoupa and 
Ginsburg), although the list is by no means exhaustive. 
First, there are the jobs as independent investigators or on 
independent review commissions, doing things like investigat-
ing scandals and writing reports on appropriate reforms that the 
government should undertake (pp 79, 87, 89). These are quasi-
judicial high-status jobs in which the rewards go only to those 
judges who have built a reputation of holding those in power to 
account (after all, these commissions call for “independent” re-
view usually). These are jobs that might be particularly attractive 
in systems in which judges have to retire at a specified age and in 
which they still have some years of productive work ahead of 
them. The government in question, which is facing some sort of 
scandal, might not want the investigations to occur, but needs the 
public to be persuaded that a fair and impartial investigation has 
occurred. Here, the hiring of a judge who has built a reputation 
 
 48 See pp 39, 173 (mentioning how the Spanish “superjudge” Baltasar Garzón, who 
led the indictment of General Augusto Pinochet, had developed such a high reputation 
outside his home jurisdiction that when he was indicted locally for pursuing Franco-era 
crimes, he received numerous other jobs—and twenty-one honorary doctorates in other 
countries). 
 49 See, for example, Anne S. Kim, Note, Rent-a-Judges and the Cost of Selling Jus-
tice, 44 Duke L J 166, 168, 175–76 (1994) (arguing that rent-a-judges are “undesirable 
as a matter of public policy” and noting the large number of retired judges who become 
rent-a-judges). 
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for legitimacy and fearlessness in the face of government pressure 
might be the best solution. And if the jobs are attractive enough, 
and the possibility of getting them is real, then judges will strive 
to generate the kind of reputation that will help them get these 
jobs after they take retirement. Indeed, as Garoupa and Ginsburg 
explain, there is sometimes a demand for judges to move from 
their judicial roles into political roles when the political system is 
seen as having become so flawed that what it needs is a leader 
with the kind of reputation that a career in the judiciary gener-
ates (p 75). 
Second, there are the jobs that judges might perform doing 
so-called private judging—that is, sitting on arbitral tribunals 
(pp 76, 79). Arbitration, because it is private and has less access 
to the state’s monopoly on force, has to depend even more on the 
legitimacy of the decisions its judges make than does the regular, 
formal state system. The judges who get offered arbitrator jobs, 
therefore, are necessarily those who built the right kind of repu-
tation; the measure of their reputation is the willingness of pri-
vate parties to abide by their decisions. There is a fly in the oint-
ment here, which Garoupa and Ginsburg point out, in that the 
presence of high-quality arbitral options may undermine the in-
centive for the local state-sponsored system to develop a high rep-
utation (p 83). But this dynamic could easily cut the other way, as 
well; the competition from the arbitral system might make state 
systems work better, and particularly so if the arbitral system 
picks its judges from amongst those who perform the best in the 
state system. 
Third, and less utilized than options one and two, but per-
haps even more intriguing, is the possibility for judges who have 
built reputations in one setting—either individual or collective—
to be hired by other judicial systems that want to, in effect, buy a 
judicial reputation (pp 194–95). For example, one might imagine, 
quite plausibly, a country or region that has decided that it wants 
to build the kind of judicial system that will attract foreign inves-
tors. One can also imagine, equally plausibly, that one of the key 
things that foreign investors are worried about is expropriation of 
their assets by some future populist government that runs on a 
platform of “take from the evil foreigners.”50 In this scenario, the 
 
 50 The classic work on this topic is Douglass C. North and Barry R. Weingast, Con-
stitutions and Commitment: The Evolution of Institutions Governing Public Choice in 
Seventeenth-Century England, 49 J Econ Hist 803 (1989). See also generally Gary W. 
Cox, Marketing Sovereign Promises: The English Model, 75 J Econ Hist 190 (2015). 
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country seeking to attract foreign investment might consider of-
fering positions in its judiciary to judges who have built strong 
judicial reputations—and particularly reputations for standing 
up to state misbehavior—elsewhere. The Dubai International 
Financial Centre is one such example, in that it uses a common-
law-modeled court system with judges hired from a variety of 
common-law jurisdictions, explicitly to attract foreign invest-
ment, while being located within the United Arab Emirates’ 
civil-law system.51 
To be clear, Garoupa and Ginsburg do not go as far as we do 
in seeing the positive value for judicial-reputation creation via the 
incentives provided by the prospect of future employment in al-
ternative settings. They express concern about adverse selection 
(that the wrong kind of person will be attracted to the judiciary) 
(p 82) and negative effects on reputation (perhaps if judges are 
seen as working harder in order to enhance their prospects for 
future employment, as opposed to working hard in order to pur-
sue justice or another “pure” goal, that will cause the public to 
think worse of judges) (p 83). We are not so concerned. Adverse 
selection problems can be ameliorated by having better selection 
systems. And even if the wrong kinds of candidates get through 
(the candidates who care more about self than others), that is not 
such a big problem if these judges can be given the right kinds of 
incentives to pursue the right kind of reputation. Garoupa and 
Ginsburg, we think, could be more eager to embrace the possibil-
ities for using the prospect of lucrative or prestigious postjudicial 
employment as a means of enhancing the incentives for judges to 
pursue reputation. 
IV.  ALTERNATIVE FUNCTIONAL THEORIES 
One reason why we are a bit skeptical of the functional claims 
that Professors Garoupa and Ginsburg make is that we do not 
think that judicial systems around the globe are as yet designed 
to enhance reputation to the extent Garoupa and Ginsburg sug-
gest. Plus, we think it plausible that there are alternative func-
tional explanations for why judicial institutions are the way they 
are, and Garoupa and Ginsburg have not persuaded us that these 
 
 51 See Alejandro Carballo, The Law of the Dubai International Financial Centre: 
Common Law Oasis or Mirage within the UAE?, 21 Arab L Q 91, 95–100 (2007); Jurisdic-
tion: Opting In to the Dubai International Financial Centre (Linklaters, Dec 6, 2011), ar-
chived at http://perma.cc/J6EJ-3S9W. 
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alternative explanations are not also playing a role (perhaps 
alongside reputation). Below, we sketch out one such explanation. 
Garoupa and Ginsburg tell us that the reason different judi-
ciaries have different structural features is that these different 
structures are aimed at optimizing the proper amount of reputa-
tion that a particular judiciary needs to serve its society best (p 2). 
And Garoupa and Ginsburg’s foil here is the path-dependence or 
inertia explanation that dominates the literature (pp 7–8, 59). We 
applaud the moves both to provide a functionalist explanation 
and to question the standard path-dependence story for why we 
have the institutions we do. But what if there were other func-
tionalist explanations—ones that did not rest on reputational 
considerations? 
One such explanation is the holdout problem. Systems that 
have strong norms or requirements as to unanimous deci-
sionmaking are by definition more concerned with holdouts, be-
cause a requirement of unanimous decisionmaking necessarily 
gives considerable power to anyone willing to threaten to hold 
out.52 By contrast, there is relatively little danger of holdouts in a 
highly individualized judicial system. In such systems, the judges 
make up their own minds and their decisions get aggregated at 
the end; there are no holdout problems, just winners and losers. 
Once we see the decision to use one structure or the other to 
design a judicial system in terms of the risk of holdouts, then the 
next step is to ask whether different contexts call for the social 
planners to be more or less concerned about holdouts. Imagine, 
for example, a society that is highly polarized along race, religion, 
and income grounds. Holdouts might be highly likely in such a 
society in cases involving certain subject areas (for example, hu-
man or civil rights). And so one might expect that courts tackling 
these issues would be individualized. However, one might also im-
agine certain types of topics (for example, issues having to do with 
the banking sector’s stability) for which neither the public nor the 
judiciary has strong preferences. For these types of topics, the risk 
of a holdout might be minimal and the enhancement of the quality 
of the decision by forcing the members of the court to discuss and 
compromise might be considerable. 
We are by no means certain that the foregoing holdout prob-
lem really is one that drives the difference in structures that one 
 
 52 See Richard A. Epstein, Covenants and Constitutions, 73 Cornell L Rev 906, 922 
(1988) (“The holdout problem occurs in its most extreme form when unanimous consent is 
necessary.”). 
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sees around the world. The point, though, is that it is a plausible 
alternate functional explanation, and it has nothing to do with 
reputation creation. 
CONCLUSION: THE FUTURE (LIKELY) RELEVANCE OF GAROUPA 
AND GINSBURG’S REPUTATIONAL THEORY 
Our final observation is that regardless of whether Professors 
Garoupa and Ginsburg’s view accurately represents the reality of 
why current judicial systems are structured the way they are to-
day (we suspect that there is much more path dependence in the 
equation than Garoupa and Ginsburg are ready to concede), we 
think that the reputational model is going to become more and 
more important as time goes on. And that will happen not because 
social planners realize that judicial systems should be designed to 
pursue certain kinds of reputations, but because of the rapid 
growth in recent years in the external monitoring, evaluation, and 
relative ranking of judicial systems. As Garoupa and Ginsburg de-
scribe in their penultimate chapter, the past two decades have 
seen phenomenal growth in the number of relative rankings of 
judicial institutions around the world (p 176). Among the most 
prominent of these are those produced by the World Bank and 
Transparency International.53 But there are also rankings pro-
duced by academics and for-profit organizations.54 There are 
weaknesses in these rankings, as numerous researchers (includ-
ing one of the authors of this book) have pointed out.55 But they 
are being constantly critiqued and improved and, most im-
portantly, are taken seriously by the markets and therefore the 
countries that are being rated. Credit rating agencies use them 
and governments—particularly emerging-market governments—
 
 53 See, for example, Anja Rohwer, Measuring Corruption: A Comparison between the 
Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index and the World Bank’s World-
wide Governance Indicators, 7 CESifo DICE Report 42, 44–49 (Autumn 2009). 
 54 For discussions of rankings of judicial systems and individual judges in the US 
context, see generally, for example, Thomas J. Miles, Do Attorney Surveys Measure Judi-
cial Performance or Respondent Ideology? Evidence from Online Evaluations, 44 J Legal 
Stud S231 (2015); Theodore Eisenberg, U.S. Chamber of Commerce Liability Survey: In-
accurate, Unfair, and Bad for Business, 6 J Empirical Legal Stud 969 (2009). See also 
generally Stephen J. Choi, Mitu Gulati, and Eric A. Posner, Judicial Evaluations and In-
formation Forcing: Ranking State High Courts and Their Judges, 58 Duke L J 1313 (2009). 
 55 See, for example, Kevin E. Davis, Legal Indicators: The Power of Quantitative 
Measures of Law, 10 Ann Rev L & Soc Sci 37, 41–46 (2014). See also generally Tom 
Ginsburg, Pitfalls of Measuring the Rule of Law, 3 Hague J Rule L 269 (2011). 
11 GULATI&GEORGE_BKR_IC (MLM) (DO NOT DELETE) 9/20/2016 2:26 PM 
1714  The University of Chicago Law Review [83:1683 
   
frequently feel compelled to report them to foreign investors.56 A 
recent bond issue by Mozambique (its first) is particularly illus-
trative. The country, in its bond prospectus, reported its rank-
ings on both the World Bank’s Worldwide Governance Indicators 
and Transparency International’s 2014 Corruption Perceptions 
Index, and also discussed the rankings of neighboring countries 
in Africa, such as South Africa.57 Put simply, if the quality of a 
country’s judiciary is important to its cost of borrowing on the in-
ternational markets, the country will make sure to invest in im-
proving that system and its ranking—and that in turn means set-
ting up the right incentives for judges to pursue the right kind of 
reputation. Equally important for many poor countries is the fact 
that development agencies often look to these indicators in deter-
mining where to allocate funding.58 
But that is not all. As more and more information becomes 
available about individual judges and courts and their perfor-
mances, it becomes easier to rate them on factors such as the 
speed with which they produce decisions, the rates at which those 
decisions are reversed by higher courts, the rates at which they 
are cited by other courts, the credentials of those who are selected 
to be judges, the satisfaction levels of those who have had cases 
before them, and so on. Again, there are criticisms that can fairly 
be leveled at all of these ratings.59 But the bottom line is that we, 
as a global society, are moving in the direction of being able to 
increasingly evaluate not only the overall quality of a judicial sys-
tem, but also individual courts and judges. In turn, to the extent 
judges care about their evaluations (and we suspect they care, or 
can be made to care), the result will surely be an enhanced pur-
suit of the kinds of reputation contained in these measures. And 
that fact, Garoupa and Ginsburg posit, will affect the structuring 
of judicial systems. 
At bottom, Garoupa and Ginsburg have made an invaluable 
contribution to the literature on judicial institutions not only in 
 
 56 For an example of the use of these measures by rating agencies, see Richard 
Cantor, Moody’s Sovereign Rating Methodology *18–19 (Moody’s Investors Service, May 
31, 2012), archived at http://perma.cc/WS2Q-GRFA (listing the World Bank indicators 
as important determinants of a country’s credit rating). 
 57 See Prospectus Dated 15 April 2016: The Republic of Mozambique *12–13, 27–28 
(Apr 15, 2016), archived at http://perma.cc/5PLD-AVE9. 
 58 See M.A. Thomas, What Do the Worldwide Governance Indicators Measure?, 22 
Eur J Development Rsrch 31, 31, 34 (2010). 
 59 See, for example, Joshua B. Fischman, Reuniting ‘Is’ and ‘Ought’ in Empirical Le-
gal Scholarship, 162 U Pa L Rev 117, 130–54 (2013) (criticizing empirical studies that use 
citation rates, reversal rates, and interjudge disparities to measure judicial quality). 
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terms of providing an alternative paradigm for understanding 
why we have the institutions we do have, but also in terms of 
helping us predict the future shape that these institutions are 
likely to take. 
